This project has received funding from the European Research Council under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme
(Grant Agreement n. 669194)
(Neunkirchen, 25/8/1912 - Santiago de Chile, 29/5/1994)
Member - Politburo (1958-1989)Member - "Small Circle" (1971-1989)
Secretary General - Central Committee (1971-1989)
As Secretary General of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany Erich Honecker shaped the East German economic and foreign policy most. It was him who took the final decisions. By introducing and pursuing the concept of “Unity of Economic and Social Policy” (1971–1989) he set the framework in which the East German economic elites had to act. Despite reoccurring warnings from the state and party apparatuses, he did not allow any change of this policy, even though it caused growing indebtment and dependence on the West. Possibly this was a result of his socialization in the interwar period and the ever-present fear of another people’s uprising. The various economic actors and bodies were controlled via the meetings of a so-called “small circle” assembled by Honecker, who reportedly lacked any deeper understanding of and interest in economics. Ideological and political provisions dominated over economic facts. His closest economic advisor and expert in general was Günter Mittag. With regard to economic and political relations to West Germany Alexander Schalck-Golodkowski gained influence throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Under Honecker’s reign, German-German relations were settled through the Basic Treaty of 1972 and thereafter the GDR was diplomatically recognized by all Western countries. Honecker personally engaged in developing political and economic relations to the West on a bilateral basis. He aimed at increasing his personal and the GDR’s international prestige and economic exchange with the West. Despite pronounced demarcation, towards the end of the 1970s, his policy towards West Germany and the East German financial dependence on the West became a matter of conflict with the Soviet Union. Against this backdrop, Honecker strictly followed the Soviet line of non-recognition of the EEC, even though there is some evidence that he regarded West European integration as a model for further integration of the CMEA.
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It is hard to measure the Prime Minister’s influence on the East German economic policy and the GDR’s dealing with the West. He was personally involved in the early negotiations between East and West Germany, nevertheless, his infl... |
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Alexander Schalck-Golodkowski was the most enigmatic figure of the East German economic elite. As the founding father and head of the Commercial Coordination division (Bereich Kommerzielle Koordinierung or KoKo), he presided over a sector that... |
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As Chairman of the East German State Planning Commission Gerhard Schürer was always part of the inner circle of the GDR’s economic elite. However, his power was limited and Honecker never promoted him to membership in the Politburo.... |
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As director of the Zentralinstitut für sozialistische Wirtschaftsführung, Helmut Koziolek was an appreciated expert in the reform era of the late Ulbricht years. Under Erich Honecker’s leadership he supposedly lost his influenc... |
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Günter Mittag was the economic mastermind of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany. Within the provisions set by Erich Honecker he executed control over the East German economy. He served as Secretary of the Central Committee for Economics... |
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Appointed Foreign Minister soon after the diplomatic recognition by the West, Oskar Fischer became one of the main East German representatives abroad. While throughout the 1970s the heads of government and state, Willi Stoph and Erich Honecker... |
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Throughout the 1970s, Herbert Häber was one of Erich Honecker's main advisors in political relations to West Germany. He was ousted from his position after his approach caused trouble with the Soviets in 1984. Despite his frequent and int... |
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From 1973 to 1976 Werner Krolikowski replaced Günter Mittag as Secretary of the Central Committee for Economics. He had no professional or academic experience in this field, nevertheless, initially he aimed at learning the ropes. However,... |
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The head of the East German Ministry of State Security naturally had an in-depth knowledge about the overall situation in the GDR – also regarding economics. Mielke had a close relationship to Erich Honecker and they exchanged their view... |
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While the Minister of Foreign Trade, Horst Sölle, was a rather colorless person in the GDR’s Western Trade, State Secretary and later Deputy Minister Gerhard Beil executed a great deal of the ministerial day-to day business. He was ... |
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Personal memorandum on the consultations of the SED Politburo on 09.08.1983
BArch, DE 1/58704 | Bl. 272–277
In this meeting of the “small circle” after the first “Strauß loan,” Honecker remarked: “The Milliardenkredit is not here to bridge gaps in the plan. No minister can rely on this. We have to act as if we would not have the money.” He pointed to the necessity of reducing short- and medium-term loans as well as continuity in the policy of reducing imports and increasing exports. Honecker was fully aware that the prolongation of the extreme foreign trade strategy would face opposition in the West, however, at that time there was still no alternative to reducing imports and selling oil on the world market. Nevertheless, pointing to developments in other Socialist countries, Honecker stated: “I want to put on record, that our economic system is altogether in best order. It just depends on using the advantages of socialism properly. I am saying this, because there is talk about reforms in many countries.” Even tough, the GDR had just prevented bankrupty, there was no intention to change the failed economic policy. The leadership opted for a continuous muddling-through. - Available only in the archive: https://www.bundesarchiv.de |
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Current status of the GDR’s balance of payments with the West in 1978/79
BArch-DDR, DL 226/1248 | Bl. 220–238,
This assessment of the GDR's balance of payments produced by the Chairman of the State Planning commission, the Minister of Finance and the country's leading bankers analyzed the causes and consequences of East Germany's growing indebtedness since the early 1970s. Their conclusion stated the obvious: “This spiral cannot be prolonged.” It was entirely clear that “without the willingness of foreign, and especially capitalist banks to provide further loans in the amount needed, the planned imports and the due payment obligations cannot be realized.” Without a fundamental turnaround in the GDR’s trade balance with the West, debt was expected to skyrocket until the mid-1980s. - Available only in the archive: https://www.bundesarchiv.de |
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Minutes from Memory. Conversation Erich Honecker - György Aczél
SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/J IV 2/2A/2551 | Bl. 192–212
In this conversation Honecker speaks frankly about his perception of the EEC in comparison with the CMEA. Clearly, in his view the EEC had become a desirable role model for the CMEA. - Available only in the archive: https://www.bundesarchiv.de |
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Memorandum on the discussion of the draft of the five-year plan 1976–1980 presided by Honecker
BArch-DDR, DE 1/58633
In this meeting of the “small circle” in November 1976 dealing with the next five-year plan the Chairman of the State Planning commission, Gerhard Schürer, stated: “The gap between imports and exports has widened further but it has to be closed by all means. That is a fateful question for the GDR.” In the following discussion some thought about rigorous import cuts, others reasoned about the causes within the CMEA and problems on the Western sales markets. Nevertheless, Günter Mittag and Erich Honecker also highlighted positive examples of trade relations with the West and the growing Western acceptance of countertrades. Honecker concluded that the plan 1976–1980 is shaped by the enforcement of the “Unity of Economic and Social Policy,” which he did not intend to change. Honecker did not expect any progress in CMEA integration, expressed his worries about the balance of payments, and advocated increasing exports to the West and developing countries as well as cooperation on third markets if they earned hard currency. - Available only in the archive: https://www.bundesarchiv.de |
