This project has received funding from the European Research Council under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme
(Grant Agreement n. 669194)
(Stettin, 9/10/1926 - Berlin, 18/3/1994)
Secretary of Economics - Central Committee (1962-1973)Member - Politburo (1966-1989)
Member - "Small Circle" (1971-1989)
First Deputy Chairman - Council of Ministers (1973-1976)
Head - Working Group Balance of Payments (1974-1989)
Head - Economic Commission (1976-1989)
Head - Working Group FRG (1976-1989)
Secretary of Economics - Central Committee (1976-1989)
Günter Mittag was the economic mastermind of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany. Within the provisions set by Erich Honecker he executed control over the East German economy. He served as Secretary of the Central Committee for Economics 1962–1973 and 1976–1989. As one of the protagonists of the East German economic reforms of the 1960s that also contributed to Walter Ulbricht’s ousting from power in 1971 he was given a formal pause 1973–1976, but in fact he never lost his influence and remained member of the Politburo as well as part of the “small circle.” Additionally, he became Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers 1973-1976 and concentrated certain economic powers at this post. After he retook office as Secretary of Economics in 1976 he presided over several newly formed economic bodies of the party, like the Economic Commission (1976-1989), the Politburo Working Group on Balance of Payments (1976-1989), and the Working Group FRG (1976-1981). Additionally, Alexander Schalck-Golodkowski’s Commercial Coordination division came under his and Honecker’s direct control. Almost every economic decision passed Mittag’s desk. Although day-to-day business was shaped by actors from the state apparatus, Mittag engaged in the final negotiations with Western countries (including the FRG) and sanctioned every deal with the West. His attitude towards relations to the West is hard to measure. When dealing with the West he worked on increasing exchange, however, against the backdrop of economic realities, internally, he consequently demanded a reduction of imports from the West. Only once, in 1977, he joined forces with the Chairman of the State Planning Commission Gerhard Schürer and directly warned Honecker about the foreseeable consequences of the “Unity of Economic and Social Policy.” After Honecker’s harsh rejection, Mittag never again objected the general secretary’s line and relied on emergency measures to solve the acute economic and financial problems of the GDR.
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While the Minister of Foreign Trade, Horst Sölle, was a rather colorless person in the GDR’s Western Trade, State Secretary and later Deputy Minister Gerhard Beil executed a great deal of the ministerial day-to day business. He was ... |
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As Minister of Finance Siegfried Böhm was among the first who warned about the potential consequences of growing indebtedness to the West. He was a member of the Working Group Balance of Payments. At the end of the 1970s, Böhm was am... |
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As head of the SED’s Department of Planning and Finance, Günter Ehrensperger, was the party’s counterpart of the head of the East German State Planning Commission. However, the actual economic planning was carried out by the S... |
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Appointed Foreign Minister soon after the diplomatic recognition by the West, Oskar Fischer became one of the main East German representatives abroad. While throughout the 1970s the heads of government and state, Willi Stoph and Erich Honecker... |
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As Secretary General of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany Erich Honecker shaped the East German economic and foreign policy most. It was him who took the final decisions. By introducing and pursuing the concept of “Unity of Economic a... |
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Werner Jarowinsky was a longstanding economic functionary of the GDR. Formally, his area of responsibility as Secretary of the Central Committee included foreign trade, however, on the party-level the Economic Secretary, Günter Mittag, mo... |
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The President of the East German Central Bank belonged to those economic experts who were permanently aware of the worsening economic and financial situation of the GDR. In the late 1970s he contributed to analyses warning about rising debts a... |
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From 1973 to 1976 Werner Krolikowski replaced Günter Mittag as Secretary of the Central Committee for Economics. He had no professional or academic experience in this field, nevertheless, initially he aimed at learning the ropes. However,... |
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Without having direct influence on East German economic and foreign policy, the President of the German Foreign Trade Bank Werner Polze was fully aware of the GDR’s financial situation and played a certain role during the debt crisis, es... |
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Despite being in office for more than two decades, in economic relations to the West, Horst Sölle remained a rather colorless person. In the first few years after the diplomatic recognition of the GDR he paid a couple of state visits and ... |
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The installation of the Working Group CMEA of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany was another sign of the party’s intention to increase control over foreign trade. Naturally, the Working Group CMEA headed by Horst Tschanter had several ... |
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Comparable to the SED’s Secretary of the Central Committee for Trade, Supply and Foreign Trade Werner Jarowinsky, the head of the Department of Trade, Supply and Foreign Trade had hardly any actual influence on foreign trade and did not ... |
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The head of the East German Ministry of State Security naturally had an in-depth knowledge about the overall situation in the GDR – also regarding economics. Mielke had a close relationship to Erich Honecker and they exchanged their view... |
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Alexander Schalck-Golodkowski was the most enigmatic figure of the East German economic elite. As the founding father and head of the Commercial Coordination division (Bereich Kommerzielle Koordinierung or KoKo), he presided over a sector that... |
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As Chairman of the East German State Planning Commission Gerhard Schürer was always part of the inner circle of the GDR’s economic elite. However, his power was limited and Honecker never promoted him to membership in the Politburo.... |
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Personal memorandum on the consultations of the SED Politburo on 09.08.1983
BArch, DE 1/58704 | Bl. 272–277
In this meeting of the “small circle” after the first “Strauß loan,” Honecker remarked: “The Milliardenkredit is not here to bridge gaps in the plan. No minister can rely on this. We have to act as if we would not have the money.” He pointed to the necessity of reducing short- and medium-term loans as well as continuity in the policy of reducing imports and increasing exports. Honecker was fully aware that the prolongation of the extreme foreign trade strategy would face opposition in the West, however, at that time there was still no alternative to reducing imports and selling oil on the world market. Nevertheless, pointing to developments in other Socialist countries, Honecker stated: “I want to put on record, that our economic system is altogether in best order. It just depends on using the advantages of socialism properly. I am saying this, because there is talk about reforms in many countries.” Even tough, the GDR had just prevented bankrupty, there was no intention to change the failed economic policy. The leadership opted for a continuous muddling-through. - Available only in the archive: https://www.bundesarchiv.de |
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Memorandum on the discussion of the draft of the five-year plan 1976–1980 presided by Honecker
BArch-DDR, DE 1/58633
In this meeting of the “small circle” in November 1976 dealing with the next five-year plan the Chairman of the State Planning commission, Gerhard Schürer, stated: “The gap between imports and exports has widened further but it has to be closed by all means. That is a fateful question for the GDR.” In the following discussion some thought about rigorous import cuts, others reasoned about the causes within the CMEA and problems on the Western sales markets. Nevertheless, Günter Mittag and Erich Honecker also highlighted positive examples of trade relations with the West and the growing Western acceptance of countertrades. Honecker concluded that the plan 1976–1980 is shaped by the enforcement of the “Unity of Economic and Social Policy,” which he did not intend to change. Honecker did not expect any progress in CMEA integration, expressed his worries about the balance of payments, and advocated increasing exports to the West and developing countries as well as cooperation on third markets if they earned hard currency. - Available only in the archive: https://www.bundesarchiv.de |
